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Abstract
By engendering horizontal diﬀerentiation, non-price advertising in-
creases the incentives to accommodate on the price dimension. How-
ever, advertising also increases the size of the market and, conse-
quently, the payoﬀs to price undercutting, which induces more ag-
gressive price competition. We propose a theory in which advertis-
i n gh a sad i ﬀerent eﬀect on price competition according to the level
of market maturity. In mature markets - where potential growth in
low - only the price accommodation eﬀect is present. In immature
markets, both eﬀects are present. Therefore, advertising is more pro-
competitive (less anti-competitive) in immature markets. Evidence
from several Brazilian beer markets corroborates the theory.
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email: jmpm@stanford.edu.
11 Introduction
Advertising is an important dimension through which ﬁrms compete in sev-
eral industries. Recently, increasing attention has been given to its eﬀects on
pricing decisions. Although several studies on the eﬀects of advertising on
prices were conducted, very few points are consensual. Are advertising and
price substitutes or complements? If substitutes, in what kind of industries
and markets should one fear anti-competitive eﬀects of advertising? Needless
to say, the answers to these questions bring important policy implications. In
this paper, we propose a theory on how advertising aﬀects prices on mature
(low growth potential) versus immature (high growth potential) markets,
and confront it with data from the Brazilian beer market.
Advertising is usually classiﬁed into two categories: price and non-price.1
Price advertising conveys relevant information about the product, such as
existence, quality and, of course, price. Non-price advertising tries to change
consumers’ preferences, associating products to trendy lifestyles, family feel-
ings, and so on. There are plenty of models that evaluates the eﬀects of
both kinds of advertising on prices. Stigler [1961], Nelson [1970], Nelson
[1974], Grossman and Shapiro [1984] and Milgrom and Roberts [1986] stress
that price advertising reduces the costs consumers face to get informed. They
conclude that price advertising increases demand elasticities, and bring prices
down. Some empirical evidence corroborates these results: Kwoka [1984] and
Milyo and Waldfogel [1999], for example, study in markets where price ad-
vertisement bans were overturned. In these cases, allowing price advertising
reduces ﬁnal prices, although the overall eﬀect remains unclear.
In contrast, Sutton [1974], Dixit and Norman [1978], Shaked and Sut-
ton [1982] and Economides et al [1994] argue that product diﬀerentiation
induces concentration. Since non-price advertising are mainly to diﬀerenti-
ate products, these papers predict a positive association between non-price
advertisements and prices. Some empirical evidence support this view (Eskin
[1985] and Cox et al [1987]).
Here, we focus on non-price advertising to tackle the following question:
how should advertising aﬀect the amount of competition for a certain level
of market maturity?2 Advertising produces consumer heterogeneity, creating
1Names may vary. Price advertising is also known as hard or informative advertisement.
Non-price advertising are also labelled soft, persuasive or even goodwill advertising.
2From now on, advertising and non-price advertising are used interchangeably, unless
2“clusters” of preferences for speciﬁc products. Through this channel (, since
it creates clusters,) advertising (should) dampens incentives to compete in
the price dimension and, therefore, raise prices.3 On the other hand, there
is a second eﬀect: advertising changes the size of the market by bringing
in new consumers. Thus, when ﬁrms advertise, they face higher demands,
which increases the payoﬀ to price undercutting, and therefore induces ag-
gressive price competition. The “increasing demand” eﬀect is determined
by the potential growth of the consumer market. Therefore, in immature
markets, where potential for growth is high, advertising induces more price
competition than in mature markets, where potential growth is low. Indeed,
in our empirical analysis this diﬀerence is documented. In markets where
the potential sales growth is higher, advertising is not associated with higher
prices, while in established, more mature markets, advertising is associated
with higher prices. The diﬀerence is signiﬁcant both economically and sta-
tistically, and it is robust to several controls and speciﬁcations.
The empirical literature has documented evidence that non-price adver-
tising has, concurrently, both the “increasing demand ” and the “diﬀeren-
tiating products” eﬀects. Seldon, Banerjee and Boyd [1993] document, for
the cigarette industry, that non-price advertising by one ﬁrm increases both
the ﬁrm-level demand, relative to competitors, and the market level demand.
As argued above, these two aspects of non-price advertising have markedly
diﬀerent implications for aggressiveness in price competition, and whether
advertising increases or decreases aggressiveness depends crucially on the
balance between these two eﬀects. Therefore, it is important to isolate them,
and determine how market conditions aﬀect their relative importance. This
is precisely what this paper does, both theoretically and empirically. In par-
ticular, the distinction between mature and immature market made here may
explain why the empirical literature on non-price advertising performed so
poorly.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we outline the model. The
empirical strategy is described in section 3, and results are presented in sec-
tion 4. Section 5 concludes, with focus on the important policy implications
t h er e s u l t so ft h i sp a p e rb r i n g .
otherwise noted.
3This eﬀect is well known by the literature cited above.
32 The Model
2.1 Preferences and Technologies
The goal is to analyze the diﬀerent roles non-price advertising plays in mature
and immature markets. First, however, it is necessary to deﬁne consumers
make choices between competing brands and, secondly, how advertising af-
fects consumer’s choices. The model has one set of consumers and two ﬁrms,
each oﬀering on diﬀerentiated brand of a certain product.
Firms are labelled A and B. pA and pB are the prices of the brands pro-
duced by A and B, respectively. Consumers’ personal preferences about each
brand distort the perceived relative price. More speciﬁcally, let consumer i
perceive prices as pA + β
i and pB,w h e r eβ
i ∈ [−1,1].I fβ
i > 0,c o n s u m e r
i prefers brand B to A, and conversely if β
i < 0. Additionally, there is a
closely related product of price α w h i c hc o m p e t e sa sa no u t s i d eo p t i o nf o r
the two brands. This product may be thought as a near substitute or even
an imported good which aﬀects demand for the domestic brands.
For simplicity, price is the only dimension that matters for consumers.




B} ≤ α. (1)
We make the distributive assumption that the β’s are uniformly distributed
in [−1,1].
Clearly, if β
i is very high, the consumer i w i l l i n gt op a yal o tf o rt h e
good. In this case, his demand resists to higher prices and even cheaper
outside options. This is heaven for ﬁrms. In our model, advertising does
precisely this: it concentrates the β’s on more extreme values.
Before choosing prices, ﬁrms decide simultaneously if they advertise or
not.4 This decision is made in period t =1 , and determines the distribution
of β’s ﬁrms face when choosing prices. The price choices, made in period
t =2 , are again simultaneous. After the prices are set, consumers make their











4We make the advertising decision binary just for the sake of tractability. The results
are far more general.
4More formally, the strategies of ﬁrm j ∈ {A,B} may be denoted as
{ad,nad} in period t =1and {p ∈ R+|h1} in period t =2 ,w h e r ead stands
for advertising, nad stands for non-advertising, and h1 is the vector of choices
ﬁrms made in the ﬁrst period. For simplicity, both ﬁrms are assumed to
have constant marginal costs set to c, and pay G if they decide to advertise.
Letting Qj(h1,p A,p B) denote the inverse demand function faced by ﬁrm j
(after advertising choices are made), its proﬁt function is: πj(h1,p A,p B)=
Qj(h1,p A,p B)·(pj−c)−X j(h1)G,w h e r eX j(h1) is an indicator function that
equals 1 if ﬁrm j advertises in period t =1 .
Advertising changes the distribution of consumers feelings about each
brand. If both ﬁrms advertise, it is expected that more consumers have more
deﬁned preferences over each brand. Thus, advertisement clusters consumers
on the extremes of the preference distribution. For simplicity, the following





1 if β ∈ [−1,−1/2]
0 if β ∈ (−1/2,1/2)
1 if β ∈ [1/2,1].
(2)
This simple distribution capture some interesting features. First, advertise-
ment polarize consumers, engendering the “artiﬁcial” product diﬀerentiation
described by Comanor and Wilson [1979]. Moreover, when consumers favor
one brand, the price of the outside opti o nm u s tb ee v e nl o w e rt oo v e r c o m et h i s
new aﬀection. Hence, advertising works to increase the size of the market,
as described by Boyer [1974].
I nt h es a m es p i r i t ,i fo n l yo n eﬁrm advertises, say ﬁrm A,ac l u s t e ro f
consumers favors her and less consumers prefer B,o ra r ei n d i ﬀerent between
both ﬁrms. Again, for tractability, the distribution is:
f(ad,nad)=
½
1/3 if β ∈ [−1,1/2]
1 if β ∈ (1/2,1). (3)
T h ec a s ew h e nj u s tﬁrm B advertises is analogous. Finally, when no ﬁrm
advertises, we suppose the initial uniform distribution remains in the second
period.
The decision of advertising depends largely on the equilibrium prices that
will prevail in the second period. These prices are constrained by the outside
option price, which may seriously aﬀect ﬁrms strategies. If α, the price of the
outside option, is high enough, closely related products are not a big threat
5for ﬁrms A and B. In this case, except for very high prices, these brands
would be a normal choice in consumers baskets. In other words, the aggregate
demand for this product is well established in the sense that it does not vary
sharply with prices. Of course, moderate prices are only possible as long
a st h eu n i tc o s to fp r o d u c t i o ni ss i g n i ﬁcantly less than outside option price.
T h i sm o t i v e su st od e e ma sm a t u r et h em a r k e t si nw h i c hc + K ≤ α,w h e r e
K is a nonnegative constant. On the other hand, if the outside option price
is small relative to ﬁrms unit costs, it would be virtually impossible to keep
suﬃciently low prices in order to avoid loosing customers. In this case, the
market would be not well established relatively to closely related products,
and the aggregate demand for the product would have a high growth potential
as prices decrease. Hence, we deﬁne as immature markets those for which
c ≥ α + L,w h e r eL is a nonnegative constant.
The eﬀects of advertising on these two types of markets will be fairly
diﬀerent. First we describe the equilibrium output for mature markets. Sub-
sequently, the same is done for immature markets, and then some empirical
implications to be tested with Brazilian beer market data are derived
2.2 Mature Markets
This subsection deals with mature markets. As the name suggests, these
markets have a well established demand for their products. Here, advertising
works mainly to diﬀerentiate products, increasing market power for both
ﬁrms.
The model is solved by backward induction. First, prices and proﬁts
are derived for the case in which no ﬁrm advertises, in which only one (of
them) does, and in which both do. Then, by comparing proﬁts to the cost of
advertising, one can establish which strategic proﬁles constitute a subgame
perfect Nash equilibria. For technical purposes, let K ≥ 2.
The benchmark is the (uninteresting) case in which no ﬁrm advertises.
Here, ﬁrms compete in prices as in a standard Hotelling model. Assuming














By symmetry, it has to be that QB((nad,nad),p A,p B)=1 /2+
pA−pB















B − c). (6)
It is now easy to see that the Hotelling equilibrium prices are pA = pB = c+1,
and proﬁts are πA(nad,nad)=πB(nad,nad)=1 /2.N o t et h a tpA,p B <α ,
and, indeed, no consumer will opt for the outside option.
T h i n g sa r em o r ei n t e r e s t i n gi nt h ec a s ei nw h i c hb o t hﬁrms advertise.
Here, consumers have strong feelings about each brand and ﬁr m sf a c el o c a l l y
unresponsive demands to the competitors price. Nevertheless, ﬁrms may
loose customers to the outside option if their prices are too high. Since ﬁrm
A’s consumers have β
i ≥ 1/2, she looses market to the outside option when







{βi:pA−βi>α} 1 dβ =1− pA + α if pA >α+1 /2






(1 − pA + α)(pA − c) if pA >α+1 /2
1/2(pA − c) if pA ≤ α +1 /2. (8)
Will ﬁrms set prices so high that some consumers leave the market? By
noting that ∂πA
∂pA(α +1 /2) = ∂πB
∂pB (α +1 /2) = c − α<0, we see that the
equilibrium prices must be pA = pB = α +1 /2.H e n c e , b o t h ﬁrms dis-
criminate prices until the ﬁrst consumer of each brand becomes indiﬀerent
between staying or leaving the market. The intuition is clear: since units
costs are small relative to the outside option price, it is not worthy to in-
crease proﬁt margins at the expense of loosing customers. In mature in-
dustries, proﬁt margins are high enough to stop price discrimination when
outside competition binds. Finally, when both ﬁrms advertise, their proﬁts
are πA(ad,ad)=πB(ad,ad)=1 /2 · (α − c +1 /2).
The remaining case is when just one of the ﬁrms advertises, say A,f o r
example. Again, it is assumed that ﬁrm A does not loose customers to
the outside option. Since consumers are not completely clustered around
each ﬁrm (they are just more concentrated around A), there should be price




























The equilibrium prices are pA = c+5/3 and pB = c+4/3.S i n c eα>c+5/3,
in equilibrium no consumers will leave the market. Clearly, loyal customers
allow ﬁrm A to do some price discrimination, but not at the levels permitted
when both ﬁrms advertise. In fact, ﬁrms proﬁts are now πA(ad,nad)=2 5 /27
and πB(ad,nad)=1 6 /27.T h u s , i f ﬁrm B advertises, not just her proﬁts
would rise, but ﬁrm A, although loosing customers, would increase her pay-
oﬀ. Indeed, there are spill over eﬀects in advertising: eliminating competition
beneﬁts both ﬁrms because prices are set in even higher levels.
We are now able to discuss the equilibrium solutions for this game. Recall
that πA(nad,nad)=1 /2 and πA(ad,nad)=2 5 /27. Hence, as long as G<
23/54, (nad,nad) does not arise in equilibrium. For concreteness, let α−c =
2.T h u s , πA(ad,ad)=5 /4.S i n c e πA(nad,ad)=1 6 /27, it follows that
(ad,ad) may happen in equilibrium if and only if G<71/108 . These
calculations are just to point out some very intuitive features of our model:
for suﬃciently cheap advertising, everybody does it. On the other hand, if
advertising gets expensive, in equilibrium no one does it. Finally, for the
intermediate case, there are coordination problems and multiple equilibria.
We summarize our ﬁndings in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 For mature markets, there exist G and G with G>Gsuch
that:
1. If the cost of advertising G is less than G, there is only one equilibrium
where both ﬁrms advertise and set prices equal to α +1 /2.
2. If the cost of advertising G is more than G, there is only one equilibrium
where no ﬁrm advertises and prices are set to c +1 .
3. If the cost of advertising G is between G and G,t h e r ea r et w oe q u i l i b r i a :
one in which both ﬁrms advertise and set prices to be α +1 /2 and
8another in which ﬁrms do not advertise and charge c +1for their
products.
Comparing advertising and non-advertising equilibria, we see that ad-
vertising increases prices in mature markets. In these markets, intra-brand
competition is the relevant source of competition. Here, advertising works
to insulate ﬁrms, neutralizing any competitive pressures. In summary, by
polarizing consumers, ﬁrms gain market power and raise prices.
2.3 Immature Markets
We now turn to immature markets. Here, the aggregate demand has a high
potential growth, being very sensitive to the outside option competition.
Advertising now also works to increase demand and raise competition at
the margin. The strategy to ﬁnd equilibrium solutions is similar to the one
employed above.
Once more, the benchmark is the non-advertising case. But now, in
contrast to mature markets, ﬁrms face two potential sources of competition:
between brands and between their product and the outside option. We guess






















1/2 dβ =1 /2 · (1 − p
A + α).(11)
If the demand speciﬁcation above holds in the continuation game equilibrium,
ﬁrms care only about their prices and the outside option price. To check that
this indeed happens, the Hotelling prices must be computed. In fact, ﬁrm
A’s proﬁti sπA((nad,nad),p A,p B)=( 1 /2 −
pA−pB
2 ) · (pA − c) and, hence,
she sets pA to be 1/2 · (1 + α + c).B y s y m m e t r y , pB =1 /2 · (1 + α + c).
To verify the demand above is correct, we must verify that both ﬁrms loose
customers in equilibrium or, equivalently, that pA −α>0.S i n c et h em a r k e t
is immature, c>αand the result follows. The ﬁrms proﬁts are now given
by πA(nad,nad)=πB(nad,nad)=1 /8 · (1 + α − c)2. The lesson here is
9that, although ﬁrms oﬀer diﬀerent brands of the same product, in immature
markets their primary thre a ti st h eo u t s i d eo p t i o n .
W en o wa n a l y z et h ec a s ew h e r eb o t hﬁrms advertise. The calculations
made in the previous section still apply. In particular, the demand ﬁrm
A faces will be given by equation (7) and her proﬁts by equation (8). The
diﬀerence is now that immature markets make ∂πA
∂pA(α+1/2) = ∂πB
∂pB(α+1/2) =
c − α>0. Hence, ﬁrms loose customers in equilibrium. In this case, their
cost structure pushes them to face outside competition. In other words,
their market is not protected against close substitutes. It is straightforward
to see both ﬁrms set their prices equal to 1/2 · (1 + α + c) and have proﬁts
πA(ad,ad)=πB(ad,ad)=1 /4 · ((1 − c)2 − α2).
Finally, there is the case where just one of the ﬁrms advertises. Once
again, let ﬁrm A be the advertiser. Guessing that both ﬁrms loose customers















(We may again derive their proﬁts to get) Prices are pA = 2+α+c
2 and pB =
1+α+c
2 .S i n c e c>α , they both set prices above the outside option price.
In particular, (it) this veriﬁes that (we chose) the demands were chosen






We may now discuss equilibrium solutions. For concreteness, let c =3
and α =1 . In this case, when no ﬁrms advertise, proﬁts are πA(nad,nad)=
πB(nad,nad)=1 /8.I f o n e o f t h e ﬁrms deviates and advertises, say A,
she would get πA(ad,nad)=0 . Hence, no matter how much it costs to
advertise, (nad,nad) may always happen in equilibrium. Moreover, if both
ﬁrms advertise, their proﬁts are πA(ad,ad)=πB(ad,ad)=3 /4.I f ﬁrm A
deviates and decides not to advertise, she would get πA(nad,ad)=1 /12.W e
then conclude that (ad,ad) may happen in equilibrium if and only if the cost
of advertising is less than 2/3. More generally, we may state:
Proposition 2 For immature markets, there exists ˆ G such that:
1. If the cost of advertising G is less than ˆ G, there are two equilibria: one
in which both ﬁrms advertise and another in which no ﬁrm advertises.
102. If the cost of advertising G is more than ˆ G, there is only one equilibrium
where no ﬁrm advertises.
In any of these equilibria, both ﬁrms set prices to be pA = pB =1 /2·(1+
α + c).
2.4 Empirical Implication
In the last section, the model produced one striking result: if the market
is immature, in equilibrium, prices are not aﬀected by the level of adver-
tising. In fact, no matter the equilibrium predicts both ﬁrms to advertise
or not, prices remain to be 1/2 · (1 + α + c). This result stems from the
fact that the demand that ﬁrms face when they advertise (equation (7)) is
twice the demand they face when they do not (equation (11)). Indeed, in
immature markets, ﬁrms always loose customers to the outside option. This
means that A’s infra-marginal consumer, for example, is indiﬀerent between
brand A and the outside option, and strictly prefers any of them to brand B.
Hence, intra-brand competition is never binding in equilibrium. Now notice
that the role of advertising is to cluster consumers in the extremes of prefer-
ence distribution. Since brands will not steal consumers from each other, the
amount of consumers who prefer A to β doubles if both ﬁrms advertise. This
explains the proportional demands, which induce proportional proﬁtf u n c -
tions and, thus, equal prices in both equilibria.5 In summary, the precedence
of outside competition over brand competition in immature markets is the
deﬁning feature of our result.6
Similarly to other exercises in economic theory, this analysis should only
be thought of as a parable illustrating a general principle. The lesson here
5The strict proportionality result is certainly not robust. The assumption of piecewise
uniform distributions and constant marginal costs are essential for it. Nonetheless, these
hypotheses only emphasize the intuitive content of this paper. The result that prices react
much less to advertising in immature markets is robust to other (troublesome) distributions
and cost structures.
6More competition within the market would only strengthen our results. Imagine,
instead of two, three ﬁrms competing in the market. In immature markets, demands
with or without advertising would still be proportional and prices would not change. In
mature markets, in an advertisement equilibrium, ﬁrms would still set prices to be α+ 1
2.
On the other hand, the Hotelling model with no advertising would have more players
and, hence, its equilibrium prices should be lower, approaching the competitive levels.
The price diﬀerence between advertising and non-advertising equilibria in mature markets
would indeed be larger.
11is that, in immature markets, besides diﬀerentiating brands, advertising also
brings competitive pressures when it raises aggregate demand for the product.
In our model, the pro and anti-competitive eﬀects of advertising in immature
markets are such that they cancel out. More generally, however, ﬁndings may
be summarized in the following empirical implication:
Empirical Implication 1 Advertising is more pro-competitive (less anti-
competitive) in immature markets than in mature markets.
In the next section, we propose a test for this model. We use Brazilian
beer market data to corroborate our theory.
3 The Empirics: The Case of the Brazilian
Beer Market
3.1 From Theory to Data: the Implication
The model in section 2 provides one sharp prediction: the eﬀect of advertising
competition on price competition should diﬀer between mature and immature
markets. In the former, advertising only increases horizontal diﬀerentiation,
which decreases the competitive appetite on the price dimension. This eﬀect
is analogous to the switching cost eﬀect in Klemperer [1987]. In immature
markets, additionally from the diﬀerentiation eﬀect, advertising increases
t h es i z eo ft h em a r k e t . T h i s ,i nt u r n ,increases the competitive appetite
on the price dimension, simply because there is more to gain from price
undercutting.
The empirical implication described in the model section is fairly ethereal.
Mature and immature markets are diﬀerent because the cost of producing
the good, relative to the price of the outside option, is diﬀerent. In practice,
this implies that, while advertising brings in new consumers in immature
markets, it does not so in mature ones. For our empirical purposes, this is
tantamount to interpreting immature m a r k e t sa st h o s ew i t hr e l a t i v e l yh i g h
growth potential. The next two subsections describe the empirical applica-
tion, with special emphasis on why the Brazilian beer market presents several
interesting features for testing the theory presented. These features are: 1)
product diﬀerentiation; 2) advertising and price as competition devices; 3)
presence of a relevant outside good; and 4) variation in “market maturity”.
123.2 The Data and the Recent Industry Developments
The take our theory to the Brazilian Beer Industry Data. We observe the
share, price and Gross Rating Points (GRP) of the two largest brewers,
AMBEV and SCHINCARIOL, who represent 70% of the industry on average
during our sample period (January 2002 to January 2005) for seven regional
markets (Belo Horizonte, Brasília, Curitiba, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador
and São Paulo).
The Brazilian beer market is an interesting market for testing the ideas
presented. First, there is evidence that consumers view diﬀerent beers it
as a diﬀerentiated products, which is sine qua non for a the phenomenon
studied to exist. Indeed, plain observation of the recent marketing strategies
from AMBEV and SCHINCARIOL suggest that. SCHINCARIOL, a small
fringe brewer until the beginning of this period, successfully bid for a sub-
stantial increase in its market share. Part of the marketing strategy involved
renaming its main brand, from SCHINCARIOL to NOVA SCHIN, the latter
meaing literally “NEW SCHIN”. Not surprisingly, the advertising eﬀort
tried to build the imagine that SCHIN was something new. AMBEV, on the
other hand, placed one its main beers, ANTARCTICA, which is the clos-
est competitor to NOVA SCHIN, as the BOA, that is, the “GOOD ONE”.
Its advertising campaign actually brought a motto that said “if it’s good, it
doesn’t have to be new!”, clearing mentioning the closest competitor and also
diﬀerentiating ANTARCTICA from NOVA SCHIN. It is not inconceivable,
t h e n ,t h a tt h e s et w ob r a n d sa p p e a l e dm o r et od i ﬀerent proﬁles of consumers,
one more conservative and the other more innovative.
Another interesting feature of the data is the huge variation, over time
and across regional markets, in advertising eﬀort and price. Our measure of
advertising, GRP, is the number of times during a certain period of time (a
week) a sample of households had their television turned on during the time
a TV advertising was shown. It is indeed a better measure then advertising
expenditures because it actually captures exposition due to a campaign. It
turns out that GRP behaves erratically, with big surges and periods of no
activity. Real prices also vary substantially in our sample.
The single most important development in the Brazilian beer market over
the sample period (2002-2005) is the bid for growth made by SCHINCARIOL,
af r i n g eﬁrm, right at the middle of the sample period, August 2003. Figure
1 shows the evolution of SCHINCARIOL’s share and price over the period,
13for the whole Brazilian market (price is on the right axis, share on the left).
Figure 3 shows total SCHINCARIOL GRP over the period. This bid involved
a large marketing and advertising eﬀort, including the relabelling of its most
popular brand, from SCHINCARIOL Pilsen to NOVA SCHIN. Figures 1 and
2 indicate that the vehicle for acquiring market share was advertising: the
big surge in market share is accompanied by an increase in prices and a
signiﬁcant increase in advertising.
T h ed y n a m i c so fc o m p e t i t i o ni nt h em a r k e tm u s th a v ec h a n g e d . A M -
BEV did respond, specially with its brand ANTARCTICA. As ﬁgures 3
and 4 show, both price and advertising of ANTARCTICA reacted to the
SCHINCARIOL surge. Right after SCHINCARIOL’s bid, in August 2003,
ANTARCTICA prices went down and advertising went. However, advertis-
ing reaction was much stronger. ANTARCTICA’s prices start going down
only in November of 2003, after SCHINCARIOL eﬀectively gained market
share. The decrease is around 4.3% from its 3.24 peak in November 2003 to
3.1 in May 2004. Advertising, however, reacts much faster and steeper. Com-
paring the six months preceding August 2003 to the six subsequent months,
advertising (as measures by GRP) almost doubled, from an average of 814
to an average of 1509, an 85.2% increase.
Figures 3 to 8 indicate that AMBEV responded to SCHINCARIOL’s bid
with all three relevant brands: ANTARCTICA, BRAHMA, and SKOL.7 For
all three brands, one observe what appear to be advertising responses to
SCHINCARIOL’s bid. The largest sustain response was ANTARCTICA’s
(BRAHMA and SKOL increased advertising by 76.1% and 66.8%, respec-
tively). In terms of prices, only ANTARCTICA’s response seem relevant.
For these reasons we focus our analysis in only two products: ANTARC-
TICA and SCHINCARIOL.8
These features provide for an interesting empirical application for test-
ing the theoretical ideas in section 2. There is, specially after SCHINCAR-
IOL’s bid, a relevant rivalry in the industry. Firms are apparently competing
in both price and advertising dimensions, although advertising seems even
7ANTARCTICA, BRAHMA and SKOL had, during the sample period, an average of
10.34%, 19.98% and 31.59%, respectively.
8Regression results with all three AMBEV brands are qualitative similar to those with
only ANTARCTICA. Precision, however, decreases. Our conjecture, partially backed
by data on ﬁgures 3 to 8, is that this is precisely because BRAHMA and SKOL are
not perceived as close competitors to SCHINCARIOL, or that AMBEV responded more
strongly with ANTARCTICA.
14more important as a competition vehicle. The question, then, is: there any
diﬀerence, between diﬀerent regional markets, in the eﬀect of this intense
advertising competition on prices?
3.3 Market Maturity
We have data on seven Brazilian metropolitan areas, which can be fairly con-
sidered diﬀerent markets. Out of these seven market, four of them are located
in the richer southeast and south regions of the country (Belo Horizonte, Cu-
ritiba, São Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro), one is the Federal capital (Brasília),
and two are Northeastern capitals (Salvador and Recife), the poorest region
of the country.
From the theory, it is natural to deﬁne maturity by the overall market
growth potential. Since we do not observe the total size of the market for
the period, there is no direct measure of growth potential. Our strategy,
t h e n ,i st oc l a s s i f ym a r k e t sa sm a t u r ea n di m m a t u r ew a sb a s e do nt w od i -
mensions: GDP per capita and inequality. The assumption is that beer is a
least a normal good, and therefore poorer markets should have larger growth
potential.
In Brazil, the most consumed alcoholic beverage is cachaça,ah a r dl i q u o r
made of distilled sugar cane. It is signiﬁcantly cheaper than beer, even if
not controlled for alcohol content. And it is a substitute for beer, although
not as close as other brands of beer. Movements towards more sophisticated
products such as beer and wine tend to accompany increases in income.
Therefore, we have a setting in which there is potential for substitution into
beer due to increases in income. The identiﬁcation (of maturity) assumption
is that, in richer regional markets, this substitution between beer and cachaça
has occurred more than in poor ones. Therefore, the potential for growth is
higher in poorer markets.
Given the signiﬁcant income distribution disparity, both within and be-
tween regions, market-level income distribution is also taken into account
when deciding which markets are mature. The identiﬁcation assumption
here is that, for a given level of income, a worse income distribution implies
a poorer potential market and, therefore, a higher growth potential. Table 1
shows GDP per capita and income distribution measure for the seven regional
markets. Recife and Salvador , as expected, are both the poorest capital, al-
though the diﬀerence between Recife (second poorest) and Belo Horizonte
and Curitiba is not that large (only 5% between Recife and Belo Horizonte).
15Income distribution, as measured by the diﬀerence in total income between
the 10% richer and 40%, is signiﬁcantly worse in Recife and Salvador than in
the other metropolitan areas except Brasília, which has, by far, the highest
level of GDP per capita.
Since the diﬀerence between Belo Horizonte and Recife is so small on the
GDP per capita, we split markets into mature and immature in two diﬀerent
ways. First, we deﬁne Salvador and Recife as immature, and the other ﬁve
markets as mature. Second, we exclude both Recife and Belo Horizonte from
the sample. In the later classiﬁcation, only Salvador is immature, and São
Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Brasília and Curitiba are mature.
3.4 The Speciﬁcation
Let i be a market, j be a brand of beer (ANT and SCHIN) and t be point
in time (a month). We estimate several diﬀerent versions of the following
model:













+DUMPRODUCTj + ΨDUMPERIODt + ΠDUMMARKETi + εijt
where ADVit is the average of SCHIN and ANT GRPs over the current
period and the last two periods (therefore does not have a j subscript).
DUMMATUREi i sad u m m yf o rm a t u r em a r k e t s( a s s u m e st h ev a l u e1f o r
São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Brasília, Belo Horizonte, and Curitiba, and 0
otherwise). pijt−m are own price lags, pi−jt−m are the competitor’s price
and the ﬁrst two lags. sijt−m are the own share lags, and si−jt−m are the
competitor’s. Prices are either in logs or in ﬁrst diﬀerence, depending on the
model (see discussion below).
One speciﬁcation choice is worth explaining in further detail. We opted
for the sum of advertising eﬀorts of ANT and SCHIN, which amount to
using “industry advertising”. In terms of the model, there is little loss of
generality in doing so because the advertising equilibrium always involves
bothﬁrms advertising. Summing the advertising eﬀorts mitigates the eﬀect of
outliers produced by big spikes in one brand’s advertising. Additionally, since
16advertising both by the brands move together, it is hard to capture ﬁrm level
advertising eﬀects. The averaging out of advertising in three periods is made
to avoid capturing outlier eﬀects of advertising, which seem very relevant in
this dataset, given the erratic short-run behavior of GRP. Inclusion of time
dummies controls for pure-times eﬀects. We have to drop one market dummy
among mature and one among immature markets because otherwise there is
perfect collinearity with DUMMATUREi.
The main coeﬃcient of interest is β2. If our theory has empirical merit,
than β2 should be positive, that, is a higher level of advertising should be
associated with higher prices in mature markets. compared to immature
ones..
As an attempt to avoid capturing undue variation, we include several
market controls. Advertising eﬀorts may well respond to current - and past
- growth of the competitor’s market share. Additionally, this response may
diﬀer between mature and immature markets. Perhaps the dominant ﬁrm
(AMBEV) cares more about loosing ground on immature markets, which are
still more “up for grabs” than mature ones. Or perhaps she has strong pref-
erences for not loosing strongholds. Unfortunately, we are cognizant about
the workings, and the dynamics, of these strategic responses. Therefore, an
agnostic approach is taken, and current and lags of both own and competi-
tor’s shares are included. Similarly for prices. Own price lags are included
because there is persistence in the time-series dimension, which could lead
ADVit to capture undue variation generated by the dynamics of strategic
interaction. The period dummies (DUMPERIODt) control for pure time
eﬀects, which are relevant in this dataset, given the apparent structural break
caused by SCHINCARIOL’s bid to increase her market share in August 2003
(see ﬁgure 1).
Our data contains several complications due to uncontrolled for dynam-
ics, which produces both problems and opportunities. It is well known that
the presence of serial correlation when the lag of the dependent variable be-
longs to the equation produces bias, even when cross-section ﬁxed eﬀects are
accounted for (see Arellano and Bond [1990]). Furthermore, the serial corre-
lation on the error term contains information that can be used to estimate
the coeﬃcients. Additionally, the panel nature also opens the possibility
of heteroskedasticity between groups of observations belonging to diﬀerent
panels, which is a further opportunity for using additional information for
estimation.
We use several diﬀerent procedures that account for some or all these
17features of the data. A GMM procedure is used to account for biases due
to serial correlation and lag dependent variables (see Arellano and Bond
[1991]). A ﬁxed-eﬀect procedure is used to account for: 1) within panel
serial-correlation (AR(1) in this case; 2) for panel-speciﬁc serial-correlation
(also AR(1)); and 3) between panels heteroskedasticity. Results are presented
in the next section.
4 Results
Tables 2 to 4 contain the main empirical results.
Start with table 2, which presents the simple OLS estimates. When all
regions are considered (column (1)), the estimated coeﬃcient on the inter-
action ADVit × DUMMATUREi (β2 in equation (14)) is 0.011, and it is
reasonably well estimated (p-value = 6%). In other words, the diﬀerence,
between mature and immature markets, in the eﬀect of an 1% increase in
ADVit (sum of ANT and SCHIN) on prices is 1.1%. Is that relevant econom-
ically? The mean of the variable ADV is 2,812, with a standard deviation of
1,533, which means that an increase of one standard deviation in ADVit is
associated with an increase in price of 54% more in mature than in immature
markets.9
One troublesome estimate is the eﬀect of changes in the competitor’s
prices on own price. Decreases in rival’s prices are associated with increases
in own prices, as if prices were strategic substitutes. This fact is less puzzling
if one considers the dynamics of the SCHINCARIOL bid for market share.
The bid was mainly a tremendous advertising eﬀort, with an increase in
price (see ﬁgures 1 and 2). AMBEV, through its brand ANTARCTICA,
responded by both increasing advertising and lowering prices. Therefore it is
not surprising that the regression results showed this surprising feature. It is
outside the scope of this paper to rationalize entry with high advertising and
high price, although it is certainly an interesting topic for future research.
When Recife and Belo Horizonte are excluded, results are even stronger.
The estimated coeﬃcient of interest (β2) is both larger and slightly more
precisely estimated (p-value = 6%). All other estimated remain qualitatively
similar.
When the (potential) bias produced by serial correlation and inclusion




18stronger. Now the model is estimated in ﬁrst-diﬀerence instead of logs.1011
Again, results are economically signiﬁcant, and even more precisely esti-
mated. Consider, for example, the estimation excluding Recife and Belo
Horizonte. The diﬀerence, between mature and immature markets, of the
eﬀect of one standard deviation in ADVit (1,533) is 70 cents of real. This
is roughly 24% of the mean price (R$ 2.86), or 1.75 standard deviations of
price (R$ 0.41).
Finally, when the information on both between market heteroskedasticity
and within market serial correlation is used to estimate the model, results
are again stronger. See table 4.
4.1 Discussion
There is no claim of estimation of structural parameters. We simply estimate
controlled correlations to evaluate whether there is a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent -
among markets with diﬀerent maturity - association between advertising and
price. Evidently, there are several other determinants of price contained in
the error term εijt that might also aﬀect advertising which we do not observe.
One such determinant is the cost of advertising. If costs of advertising
diﬀer systematically among markets, then it is possible that the coeﬃcient
associated with ADVit × DUMMATUREi captures this diﬀerence, instead
of the strategic eﬀect we want to estimate. This eﬀect is more pronounced
the more regionalized the advertising decisions are. It turns out that the
advertising captured by GRP, TV commercials, is done mainly on the na-
tional level, with a signiﬁcant amount of TV time bought on open-channel-
nationwide broadcast programs. Figures 9 and 10 show the ANT and SCHIN
GRPs series for all seven regions. Visual inspection shows the GRP is highly
correlated across markets, which is indicative that advertising campaigns are
indeed nationwide.12 This fact mitigates signiﬁcantly the possibility that
ADVit × DUMMATUREi captures diﬀe r e n tc o s ts t r u c t u r e so fa d v e r t i s i n g
across markets.
Another possibility is the degree of competition. Evidently, market power
10This is why there is no estimate for the mature market dummy: it does not vary over
time.
11This is not relevant. It is a feature of the statistical package used, STATA. If ﬁxed
eﬀect dummies were to be used, results would be similar.
12More especiﬁcally, the average correlation coeﬃcient between region is 0.77 and 0.92
for ANT and SCHIN, respectively.
19is contained in the error term. Indeed, one might expect the eﬀect of advertis-
ing on prices to diﬀer among market with diﬀerent degrees of supplier market
power. The relevant question, however, is how market power determines the
eﬀect of advertising, and how market power and maturity are related. Our
speciﬁcation addresses this concern in several ways. First, note that sys-
tematic (constant in time) diﬀerences in market power between markets are
controlled for by the market ﬁxed eﬀects dummies. Second, we control, al-
beit imperfectly, for changes in market power overtime simply by including
the shares of SCHIN in the regression. Note that this is market with one
dominant ﬁrm, AMBEV, and one relevant fringe, SCHINCARIOL. Hence
the larger the share of SCHIN, the more contested the market should be.
On the other hand, it is well known that shares (or concentration) are not
as u ﬃcient statistic for market power. Our theory, and a straight market
power story, would be indistinguishable only if three conditions are satisﬁed:
1) there are an uncontrolled for changes in market power; 3) market power
increases in mature markets relative to immature ones; and 3) advertising
softens competition in markets with more market power. Evidently, we can-
not check the ﬁrst condition (otherwise it would be controlled for). Neither
can we (and it is outside the scope of this paper) address the third condition.
We can, however, look at the evolution of prices in several markets to see if
t h e r ei se v i d e n c et h a tm a r k e tp o w e ri ni n creasing in mature markets relative
to immature. Figures 11 and 12 show that prices in mature and immature
markets move, in general, remarkably together, both for ANT and SCHIN.
This indicates that, overtime, there is very little evidence that market power
has changed diﬀerently between mature and immature markets.
5C O N C L U S I O N
Non-price advertising has, in the theory presented and in the empirical appli-
cation, a distinctively diﬀerent eﬀect on prices according to product market
maturity. Therefore, advertising can be a substitute, a complement, or even
neutral to price competition.
From a consumer welfare perspective, the literature on advertising has
concentrated on three issues: 1) the eﬀects of price advertising; 2) the ef-
fect of advertising on market structure; and 3) on the informational content
of advertising. In general, advertising is considered wasteful if its only ef-
fect is to change consumers’ preferences (Dixit and Norman [1978]), also
20called “persuasive” advertising. Furthermore, advertising would be harmful
to consumers if they induce a more concentrated market structure (Friedland
[1977], Sutton [1974], Kaldor [1950-1951]), and Sutton [1990]). If, however,
advertising conveys relevant information about the product, such as existence
(Stigler[1961]) or quality (Milgrom and Roberts [1986]), it should be welfare
increasing. The results presented here provide an additional, and indirect,
welfare implication, through be eﬀect of non-price advertising on the level
of competitiveness in the market for a certain level of market maturity.I n
markets where potential growth is high (immature), advertising tends to be
more pro-competitive than in low growth (mature) markets. Therefore, con-
sumer welfare depends on advertising not only because of informational or
market-structure reasons, but also because non-price advertising determines
the level of competitiveness, g i v e nac e r t a i nm a r k e ts t r u c t u r e .
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35Recife 7,822   491 468   122 911 19.25
Salvador 4,309   503 620   125 927 21.12
Belo Horizonte 8,093   741 888   185 528 15.28
Rio de Janeiro 10,537  1 700 823   425 295 15.17
São Paulo 13,139  2 970 266   742 720 14.96
 Curitiba 8,408   489 912   122 497 14.80
Brasília 16,361   350 827   87 732 19.90
Source: Pesquisa nacional por amostra de domicílios 2001: microdados. Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 2002. 1 CD-ROM.
# In 2002 reais
*Active population: age >= 10 years with income
TABLE 1: Income per capita (2002) and Distribution of Income (2001)
between the 40% poorer and 1% richer
Metropolitan Area B/A 40% poorer (A)#* 10% richer (B)#* Income Per Capita#


























Robust Standard Errors, p-values in parehtheses. (1): All 
Regions, (2) Except Recife and Belo Horizonte. Firm, 
product and time dummies included. Share and price of 
competitor are reported as the sum of four coefficients, 










37TABLE 3: GMM Arellano-Bond Instruments































Robust Standard Errors, p-values in parehtheses. All variables in 1st 
difference. Instruments are the third and fourth (third, fourth) of the 
dependent variable. (1): All Regions, (2) Except Recife and Belo 
Horizonte. Firm, product and time dummies included. Share and price of 






































Robust Standard Errors, p-values in parehtheses. GLS: each regions is 
allowed a different standard deviation, and different AR(1) coefficient.  (1): All 
Regions, (2) Except Recife and Belo Horizonte. Firm, product and time 
dummies included. Share and price of competitor are reported as the sum of 
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